Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/reno20

Sub-state Nationalism and Immigration in Spain: Diversity and Identity in Catalonia and the Basque Country
Sanjay Jeram

a Brock University, Canada
Published online: 12 Nov 2013.


To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2013.853998

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Sub-state Nationalism and Immigration in Spain: Diversity and Identity in Catalonia and the Basque Country

SANJAY JERAM

Brock University, Canada

ABSTRACT This article builds on recent attempts to explain why sub-state nationalist parties in West Europe and North America pursue varying discourses and policies in response to immigrant-generated diversity. It analyses the dynamics of immigrant integration in two comparable cases of sub-state nationalism: Catalonia and the Basque Country. In contrast to the hypothesis that sub-state nationalism and immigration are inherently antagonistic, nationalist parties in both cases have experimented with multiculturalism to make diversity a new marker of national identity. The recent assimilationist turn in Catalonia, however, demonstrates that regional electoral competition can sometimes complicate matters of identity.

Introduction

The demise of sub-state nationalism has been predicted by Marxists, modernists and globalization theorists; however, it remains a potent political force in advanced capitalist democracies such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Spain (Lecours, 2012). In recent decades, the onset of immigration to the territories of national minorities has intensified the confrontation of sub-state nationalist parties (SSNPs) with the ‘legitimating paradox’: too much diversity may undermine the nation-building process and lead to ‘existential suicide’ (Gagnon & Iacovino, 2006). Immigrants are considered unlikely to support nationalist mobilizations because they cannot understand the mentality of ‘la survivance’ derived from the collective memory of repression. For this and other reasons, immigrants are often portrayed as a potential ‘threat’ to the survival of sub-state nations (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 277–279).

Recent scholarship that has focused on immigrant integration policy and discourse in the context of sub-state nationalism has revealed more variance and complexity than expected by the threat hypothesis. Immigrant integration policies in Flanders, Quebec and Scotland, and discourses of SSNPs on these issues, have indeed been shown to be far from exclusionary or segregationist (Barker, 2010; Hepburn, 2011; Adam, 2013).
Moreover, there has been no clear preference for the assimilationist or multiculturalist pole of the immigration integration policy continuum among SSNPs (Hepburn, 2009b). In Spain, a country with multiple cases of sub-state nationalism, the policy instruments and discourses of the main SSNPs and governments in Catalonia and the Basque Country have also rebuffed the threat hypothesis. In Catalonia, the most popular nationalist party, Convergència i Unió (CiU), embraced aspects of multiculturalism in the early 2000s, but has added assimilationist rhetoric to its reform proposals in step with the ‘return of assimilation’ across Europe (Brubaker, 2001). In the Basque Country, immigration became a ‘hot button’ issue in the early 2000s when the Government of Spain, led by the right-wing Partido Popular (PP), introduced Law 8/2000, which restricted the rights of immigrants ‘sin papeles’ (without papers) and made the consequences of illegality much more dire (Gortázar, 2002). These changes were heavily criticized by immigrant organizations and SSNPs in the Basque Country. Law 8/2000 became the impetus for an immigrant integration framework that centred on a distinct Basque citizenship aimed at helping immigrants overcome the obstacles created by the Spanish immigration law. Within a short period diversity became a new marker of Basque identity, as the nationalists demonstrated a stronger commitment to multicultural initiatives and social support for immigrants than did the Basque branches of the state-wide parties (Jeram, 2013).

In both Catalonia and the Basque Country, then, major SSNPs have avoided the worst excesses of xenophobia and anti-immigrant rhetoric found in the discourses of Europe’s growing family of far-right-wing parties. Focusing solely on this outcome, however, would obfuscate important differences between the two cases. As noted above, Catalanian nationalists have recently added a strong assimilationist component to their integration approach that has not been replicated in the Basque case. This is an unexpected outcome given that the comparative literature on the Basque Country and Catalonia has tended to contrast the exclusionary nationalism of the former with the inclusionary nationalism of the latter. For example, Conversi (1997) has argued that the distinct developmental paths of the nationalist movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia can be explained by their varying core values. Language was the pivot around which the Catalan movement developed, whereas race and violence filled the void in the Basque case, in part due to the poor diffusion of its indigenous language (Conversi, 1990). Similarly, Jáuregui (2006, p. 239) presents Catalonia as the terra de pas (land of passage) and the Basque Country as marked by a ‘historical isolationist tendency exemplified by the concepts of universal nobility and purity of blood’. It may not be surprising, therefore, that Catalanian nationalism is progressive and accepting of immigrants. The transformation of Basque nationalism into a movement that celebrates diversity is, however, unexpected. The same line of reasoning leads to the expectation that it would be the Basque case, not the Catalan one, to be the first to turn away from multiculturalism and adopt a more assimilationist tone in response to diversity.

Accordingly, the explicit aims of this article are twofold. After a brief clarification of key concepts, such as multiculturalism, assimilationism and integrationism, in order to ground the analysis, it seeks to account for the development of multicultural discourses by mainstream Basque and Catalan SSNPs. Second, it attempts to make sense of the variation that has developed between the two cases in terms of immigrant integration discourse and policy. The first argument advanced is that SSNPs are using immigration to promote national solidarity and justify increased autonomy, or even independence. In both cases, we find evidence that this manifests itself in the form of opposition to central immigration
laws and the discourses, as well as the positions of state-wide parties with respect to diversity and integration. Finally, a second argument suggests that the assimilative turn in Catalonia stems from the electoral pressures facing the CiU.

**Conceptual Misunderstandings in Immigrant Integration**

While it was once common to juxtapose assimilationism and multiculturalism, the proliferation of new concepts such as ‘civic integration’ and ‘citizenship promotion’ has made the study of immigrant integration a difficult endeavour (Joppke, 2007; Kymlicka, 2011). In the domain of culture, assimilationism aims to reduce the differences between the immigrant and native populations whereas multiculturalism recognizes and promotes these differences. In the social domain of integration, multiculturalists favour a communitarian approach that assumes institutions and practices in society are (un)intentionally biased to favour the dominant culture. This fact makes it necessary to pursue equality by recognizing and helping newcomers overcome these barriers to full participation. Assimilationism prescribes a classic laissez-faire approach without any ‘compensation for deficits in starting points’ (Entzinger, 2000, p. 111). For the purposes of empirical analysis, multiculturalist and assimilationist models are assumed to be ideal-types that can be situated on opposite ends of a continuum.

The recent political discourse in Europe that suggests a ‘failure of integration’ on the part of immigrant populations has eroded the multicultural consensus. Avoiding the term assimilation, European governments have been keen on implementing what they deem to be ‘civic integration’ policies:

> which express the idea that successful incorporation into a host society rests on not only employment ... but also on individual characteristics typifying national citizenship, specifically country knowledge, language proficiency, and liberal and social values ... the objective of civic integration is not assimilationist uniformity but promoting functional individual autonomy. (Goodman, 2010, p. 754)

It is difficult to ignore the potential for country-knowledge, language and civics tests that are linked to entry, residence, legal status, or access to social benefits to be instruments designed to reduce cultural differences between natives and migrants or the outright exclusion of foreigners from the membership community. Even when integration is promoted, but not tied to the extension of rights, the objective of mandatory language or civics classes is to establish clear guidelines for how a member of the national community should act and speak. Without engaging in a normative discussion regarding the ‘liberal’ or ‘illiberal’ nature of integration, it can be recognized that integration measures can, and do, put assimilative pressures on immigrants.

In the following analysis of major Basque and Catalan SSNPs, the focus is on whether these parties present membership in the national community as dependent on completing integration requirements, thus indicating a desire for more assimilation. For example, in 2007, the Parti Québécois introduced a bill in the Quebec provincial legislature to render it obligatory for immigrants to demonstrate command of the French language to ‘hold public office, raise funds for a party or petition the National Assembly with a grievance’ (Triadafilopoulos, 2011, p. 862). Whether or not such a measure is in line with liberal democratic values is beside the point, the outcome, if implemented, is probably
assimilation or exclusion from national membership privileges. On the other hand, evidence of multiculturalism comes from declarations and policies that recognize and promote diversity as a defining feature of the nation. An example can be drawn from the Scottish case, in which the Scottish National Party (SNP) has discursively defined the Scottish nation as a multicultural one based on residence and ‘open to all, whether they come from England, Ireland, Pakistan, or Poland … Scotland’s strength has always lain in its diversity’. This is in sharp contrast to the discourse of British state-wide parties that ‘Britishness’ needs to be reaffirmed.

Theorizing the Sub-state Nationalism–Immigrant Integration Nexus

Early writing on nationalism invoked an image of sub-state nationalisms as conservative movements that are inherently anti-modern, illiberal, and disintegrative (Hobsbawm, 1990). In contrast to modern states that engender patriotism based on universal values, such as allegiance to a set of rules and institutions, sub-state nationalists are said to have identities that emphasize race, religion, or linguistic particularities and a common past (Viroli, 1995). These characterizations leave us with the expectation that SSNPs would be hostile to immigration and assert an exclusionary definition of the nation. The case studies examined in this article, however, discredit this hypothesis. Even though the autonomous governments in the Basque Country and Catalonia, more often than not under the control of SSNPs, play a major role in the integration of immigrants, there is no observable anti-immigrant discourse among parties in the Basque Country and such discourses are only marginally popular in Catalonia.

Opposing the threat hypothesis, Kymlicka (2001) argues that sub-state nationalists are no less likely to adopt a ‘post-ethnic nationalism’ in response to immigration than sovereign states. Rather than assuming a priori that SSNPs reject diversity, Kymlicka posits that certain conditions mediate the sub-state nationalism–immigration nexus. First, he claims that if the regional government is able to manage the volume of immigration into the sub-state national territory, SSNPs will promote an inclusionary nationalism because the threat of ‘swamping’ is removed. In Spain, there is no evidence that the Franco regime purposely tried to relocate Spaniards to Catalonia and the Basque Country, but economic opportunities brought an influx of unilingual Spanish migrants to both regions in the 1950s and 1960s (Conversi, 1997, pp. 187–221). Lacking control over immigration flows, the Catalan nationalist movement still projected a warm attitude towards Spanish migrants, so long as they respected Catalan distinctiveness and tried to learn the language. These sentiments are encapsulated by a quote from Jordi Pujol, former leader of the CiU and president of the Generalitat from 1980 until 2003: ‘anyone who lives and works in Catalonia and who wants to be Catalan is a Catalan’ (Guibernau, 2004, p. 67). Basque nationalism, on the other hand, was much more exclusivist, characterizing Spanish immigrants as a threat to the essence of Basque culture (Conversi, 1997, pp. 196–199). In the current democratic period, neither the Basque government nor the Catalan government controls immigration flows, yet SSNPs in both cases have experimented with multicultural immigrant integration policies.

Second, Kymlicka posits that a sub-state nation will only embrace immigrants and become multicultural if its regional government has control over the terms of integration. Here, he is referring to policy ambits such as education, language, employment and social welfare that can be used to define a distinct framework of immigrant integration. The
explicit link between political autonomy and the progressive move towards post-ethnic multiculturalism is tenuous and underspecified: SSNPs are equally likely to use autonomy to ‘close’ the nation to outsiders or pursue assimilationist integration policies. The decentralization of specific powers to the Catalan government in the ambit of immigrant integration occurred in 2006 (Zapata-Barrero, 2009), but the CiU had a stronger multiculturalist component to its position prior to 2003 when it led a minority government in the Generalitat. In short, the institutional logic of Kymlicka’s argument gives short shrift to the instrumental nature of nation-building and party politics.

Certainly, Kymlicka is correct to point our attention to the importance of political autonomy to the sub-state nationalism–immigration nexus, but it is much too ‘teleological to the extent that it envisions a progressive move towards post-ethnic multiculturalism’ (Barker, 2010, p. 15). In the Basque and Catalan cases specifically, the development of, and changes to, the discourses of the SSNPs cannot be readily linked to the transfer of powers to the Basque and Catalan regional governments. In both cases, but especially that of Catalonia, Kymlicka’s framework misses the persistent tension between apprehension and diversity, on the one hand, and multiculturalism, on the other.

The analytical focus on the cultural concerns of SSNPs tends to obscure the electoral concerns that are real and present in the minds of these parties. Since the transition to democracy, the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements have engendered regional parliaments in which both nationalist and state-wide parties compete for power. Although nationalist parties such as the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) and CiU have been very successful, numerous other SSNPs and state-wide parties contest competitive elections in both autonomous communities. According to some scholars, the immigration policies of parties can be readily categorized according to their ideological profile. For instance, Lahav (2004) finds corroborating evidence that members of left-leaning parties tend to support increasing immigrants’ access to citizenship rights much more so than their colleagues on the political right.

Therefore, we could hypothesize that nationalism may not be that important: SSNPs will position themselves on immigration according to their ideological profile. In some cases, such as the SNP, this proposition rings true, as the party has presented a uniformly social democratic agenda, which includes support for increasing immigration flows to Scotland and the promotion of a ‘multicultural society free from racism and intolerance’ (Hepburn, 2009b, p. 522). In other cases, however, SSNPs are not easily mapped on to the right–left axis on immigration because cultural conservatives may favour ‘get tough’ stances on immigration whereas economic conservatives prefer policies to attract cheap immigrant labour to the territory (Hepburn, 2009a). Moreover, when clashes with the state over sovereignty take centre stage, the socio-economic and ideological concerns of competing SSNPs often take a back seat to the national struggle.

The way in which party competition over immigration plays out in autonomous regions with strong SSNPs is conditioned by the wider nationalist conflict. Just as state nationalisms continue to reproduce the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion with public policies, institutions and narratives, sub-state nationalisms are also engaged in a continual process of nation-building (Bélard & Lecours, 2008). Contrary to the conceptualization of sub-state nations as fixed entities, the values that are constitutive of national solidarity are subject to contestation and change. The achievement of institutional autonomy has made it more difficult for SSNPs to rely solely on references to the group’s distinct history, culture and language to emphasize national solidarity, and they therefore seek
to utilize policy priorities and positions as embodiments of distinct national values. This can be especially productive when the resulting discourses and policies diverge from those of state-wide parties, which are targets of nationalist mobilizations and competitors for power within the regional parliament.

A central argument of this article is that the immigration integration policies and discourses of SSNPs in Catalonia and the Basque Country are a result of strategic opposition to state-level policies and proposals, as well as regional party competition. In doing so, these parties are attempting to undergird national identity with a distinct set of interests related to immigration. This process often involves exaggerating the unity of the nation and its differences with the majority nation. The nation-building imperative to highlight the distinct values of the nation makes the politics of immigration different in regions dominated by sub-state nationalist mobilization. Rather than practising ‘normal’ left–right competition, SSNPs in the Basque Country and Catalonia have, at times, defied their right–left ideological profile on diversity issues as a means to nation-build. During the early period of the integration debate, the nation-building imperative generated a multiculturalist position among SSNPs in the Basque Country and Catalonia.

The recent turn towards assimilationist rhetoric by the CiU and other SSNPs in Catalonia, however, suggests that the nation-building imperative does not operate in a straightforward manner. Over time, policy issues such as immigration that once appeared intrinsically tied to the civic and pluralist character of nation become ‘normalized’: SSNPs on the left and right seize immigration as a means of marking political space (Triadafilopoulos & Zaslove, 2006). This differs from Kymlicka’s argument because it does not predict that SSNP positions on immigrant integration will become more multicultural with increased constitutional standing, but will instead be subject to more open and partisan debate.

Catalonia

Prior to the re-establishment of the Generalitat of Catalonia in 1979, there were two significant waves of internal migration from other parts of Spain to Catalonia. In the early twentieth century, left-wing nationalists expressed optimism about the capacity for Castilian-speaking migrants to integrate into Catalan society and learn its language. Nevertheless, others professed deep concern that immigration would eventually ‘cause the loss of the distinctive characteristics of the Catalan people’, and thus concluded that the Catalan identity was very much in danger (McRoberts, 2001, p. 130). With the acquisition of autonomy during the Second Republic (1931–1936), the hegemonic Catalan party at the time, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), contended that specific policies of accommodation and linguistic assimilation would ‘destroy the myth that nationality is a racial phenomenon’ (McRoberts, 2001, p. 130). The Spanish Civil War and victory of Franco’s Nationalist forces forestalled this internal debate: Catalan political autonomy was nullified and immigration to Catalonia came to a sudden halt during the early years of the Franco regime.

Beginning in the 1950s, economic opportunities brought another wave of migrants to Catalonia from southern Spain. Under the Franco dictatorship, Catalonia had no political means with which to respond to the influx of Castilian migrants. The resulting debate among intellectuals and elites about the potential impact of immigrants on Catalan identity punctuated divisions among nationalists. The most important viewpoint was that of Jordi
Pujol. His programme emphasized the inclusionary nature of Catalan nationalism and the Catalan language as the ‘glue’ to bind the diverse nation (Pujol, 1966). Moreover, he expressed a strong desire to afford full citizenship rights to immigrants in an independent Catalonia, so long as they respected and accepted the identity of the host community. The position of the left-wing Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) echoed that of Pujol, stressing that new Catalans were welcome, but should learn the Catalan language in order to participate fully in society (Guibernau, 2004, p. 68). On the other hand, Cruells (1965) presented a more pessimistic opinion in his writings, underscoring the growing distance between the native Catalan population and Spanish migrants. Interestingly, he placed the blame on the Castilian immigrants themselves, arguing that they reject the Catalan language and way of life. This is quite different from a traditional ethnic nationalist position that those not born into the nation cannot join it, even if they desire to do so. Indeed, as Guibernau (2004) points out, Franco’s repression of the Catalan language and culture allowed certain sectors of immigrants in Catalonia to feel a sense of superiority and identify solely with the single Spanish national culture promoted by the regime.

Immigration was not on the agenda during the transition to democracy, and thus policy jurisdiction between the central government and Generalitat was not specified. As foreign immigration flows to Spain started to increase, the central government adopted an ‘efficiency model’ that gives the autonomous communities and municipal governments responsibility over most integration policies such as reception, housing, education and work (Zapata-Barrero, 2012). It was in the early 1990s that immigration first found its way on to the political agenda in Catalonia because the central government had put into place a series of regulations that highlighted the vulnerable position of the growing ‘illegal’ or irregular immigrant population. The CiU-led Catalan government responded by creating interdepartmental commissions to monitor and coordinate the action plans laid out in the Interdepartmental Plan for Immigration (1993–2000). It signalled the interest of the CiU to make immigrant integration an issue connected to Catalonia’s national project, but there was nothing controversial in the text or debates that highlighted perceived deficiencies in the central government’s handling of immigration.

Things started to change around 2000 for a few reasons. By that year, the demographic reality had become impossible to ignore: most population growth in Catalonia was due to foreign immigration rather than new births (Zapata-Barrero, 2007, p. 184). While the percentage of residents born outside Spain in Catalonia was quite low in 2000 (2.9%), the immigrant population grew rapidly and exceeded 15% by 2010 (Climent-Ferrando, 2012, p. 7). Second, the political consensus on immigration between the two major state-wide parties, the right-leaning PP and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), broke down and a period of political conflict began. After winning its first majority in the Spanish House of Deputies in 2000, the PP enacted a series of reforms to the Spanish Law on Aliens meant to dissuade would-be irregular immigrants from settling in Spain by excluding them from a wide swathe of social rights such as health care and education (Gortázar, 2002; González-Enríquez, 2009). During the PP’s prior stint as a minority government (1996–2000), CiU delegates in the House of Deputies supported its legislative agenda in exchange for various concessions pertaining to the transfer of powers to the Generalitat. When the leftist opposition parties in the Generalitat came out strongly against the reforms to the Law on Aliens, it put the CiU in a difficult position.
because the party needed both to assuage the PP and to ensure the opposition parties were not able to label the CiU as ‘sell-outs’ to the Spanish state in the eyes of the Catalan public.

The CiU’s immigration plan of 2001 highlights a delicate balancing act by the nationalist federation. The second Interdepartmental Plan of Immigration (2001–2004) maintained many of the objectives of the previous one, but added an important chapter called ‘A Catalan approach to immigration’ to demarcate a difference between the CiU’s integration philosophy from that of the state government led by the PP. In this chapter, one of the main points is that the Catalan nation is obligated to respect the diversity that immigration brings by equalizing citizenship rights and obligations for everyone who resides in Catalonia. In the same chapter, it is confirmed that immigration is one of the great challenges of the day for European societies, with Catalonia being no exception, especially bearing in mind Catalonia’s specific culture, society and politics (Zapata-Barrero, 2009, p. 133). Although it may appear innocuous, this passage represents a declaration of distinctiveness for Catalonia within Europe, using immigration as another policy ambit that justifies increased autonomy. This vision of a multinational Spain strongly clashed with the one professed by the PP, especially its leader José María Aznar, of a singular nationality within the Spanish state. Finally, the ‘Catalan approach’ recognizes the social, cultural and economic hardships that arise for immigrants, and thus commits the Generalitat to use its powers in health, education and social services to fight exclusion and promote equilibrium between a sense of belonging and respect for diversity (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001, p. 117).

Objectively, there is truth to the argument made by Davis (2008) and Hepburn (2011) that the CiU’s ‘Catalan approach’ to integration emphasizes social rights for immigrants, such as health care, education, housing, as well as rights to protest and association regardless of formal status. Decree 188/2001 on ‘Aliens and their Integration’ in Catalonia reintroduced rights to housing benefits and post-obligatory education for non-resident immigrants that were eviscerated by the PP’s reforms to the Law on Aliens. The CiU also cleverly switched the term ‘foreign immigrants’ used in the previous plan for ‘Catalans born outside of Catalonia’ so as not to differentiate between Spanish migrants and immigrants from abroad, in a sense fortifying the supposed inclusiveness of the ‘Catalan approach’. Interestingly, the CiU tacitly supported the PP’s reforms, as explained by a state-level parliamentarian from the CiU in 2000: ‘the global résumé of this law is sufficiently positive to support it... it’s a law that has two major areas: the first is the fundamental protection of the rights and freedoms of immigrants’ (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009, p. 189). Given that 2000 was the first year of the PP’s majority tenure, the party had yet to begin its political war against Spain’s internal nations. In this context the CiU was, perhaps, reluctant to alienate its governing partner at the state level during the previous four years, which had resulted in concessions to the Catalan nationalists.

Alongside the CiU’s catch-all version of citizenship, policies with assimilationist intentions were implemented with the party’s support. A succession of language laws passed in the 1990s made Catalan the language of instruction during compulsory schooling in Catalonia, whereas the Basque Country has opted for a linguistic model for education based on parental choice rather than obligation. Despite receiving much praise from the European Commission for its success in achieving true bilingualism among non-native Catalan speakers, it has been repeatedly attacked by the Catalan branch of the PP and its central leadership. During a debate prior to the 2010 Catalan elections, the CiU and other nationalist parties defended obligatory Catalan immersion as a model of integration
that prevents society from fracturing into distinct language communities. Moreover, immigrants choosing to learn only Spanish would disrupt the process of ‘normalization’ of the Catalan language in societal and professional contexts, which continues to be a major preoccupation of SSNPs in Catalonia. Catalan SSNPs have fiercely resisted the recent reform announced by the Spanish Education Minister José Ignacio Wert, which would effectively recentralize control over language policy in the realm of education and spell the end of obligatory Catalan immersion in schools.

A proposal favouring linguistic assimilation by the CiU more clearly directed at ‘new’ immigrants came before the 2003 regional elections. The campaign, nicknamed ‘CAT’, favoured the everyday use of Catalan in all aspects of social life, and thus participating businesses and institutions displayed posters clarifying that their staff would speak only Catalan to patrons, the rationale being to provide motivation for newcomers to learn Catalan, thus ensuring that Catalan remains the dominant language in society. Amidst claims that the project had racist undertones, Pujol responded that the party’s aim is to ‘treat people humanely . . . but the key for Catalonia is successful integration’ (Adler, 2003). The reactions from immigrant communities to ‘CAT’ were mixed and it is difficult to conclude whether the campaign really did motivate more immigrants to take advantage of the free Catalan classes provided by the government.4

The 2003 elections marked a historic change in leadership as the CiU did not form the government of Catalonia for the first time since Spain’s transition to democracy. The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) led a tripartite left-wing coalition government with the ERC and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV) even though the CiU retained a plurality of seats in the Generalitat.5 The tripartite government carried forward much of what the CiU started in the immigration ambit, but made significant discursive changes that emphasized points of disagreement. As noted by Zapata-Barrero (2009), the removal of the phrase ‘interdepartmental’ from the third immigration plan, called the Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2005–2008), was significant in that it establishes the political and social emphasis of the new government as opposed to the administrative one of the CiU. One novelty of the third plan is the introduction of a distinct Catalan citizenship based on residence detached from one’s status as a Spanish citizen, the intended practical implication being that an immigrant becomes a Catalan citizen by demonstrating their commitment to settle in Catalonia through the mere act of inscribing in their municipal register (Solé & Parella, 2008, p. 96). It also presented a less ambiguous embracing of multiculturalism as constitutive of Catalan culture: newcomers make Catalonia ‘stronger, richer, and more plural’ (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2005, p. 47). Amidst these changes, the relationship between the Catalan and Spanish governments was reformed on account of the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy that came into effect in 2006. Article 138 assigns the reception of immigrants to the Catalan government, which makes it the first and only autonomy statute in Spain to reference immigration.

After becoming the main opposition party, the CiU ramped up its assimilationist rhetoric in order to appeal to conservative voters. One of the party’s campaign promises in 2006 was to restrict residence-based Catalan citizenship, a concept that the party had a hand in creating. Specifically, the CiU promised that, if elected, it would introduce an integration contract for immigrants linking knowledge of the Catalan language and culture to speedier access to non-essential social services. The initiative for a ‘contract with Catalonia’ would have required immigrants to express their desire to settle in Catalonia, but with the catch that the regional government would be in charge of evaluating an immigrant’s level of
integration. Josep Antonio Duran i Lleida of the CiU, perhaps inadvertently, paired this proposal with the unofficial slogan ‘a Catalunya no hi cap tothom’ (in Catalonia, there is no room for everyone), which encapsulated its new anti-multiculturalism discourse (El Punt Avui, 2011). Not surprisingly, the left-wing parties in Catalonia fiercely criticized the proposal, but much more interesting was the fact that the PP came out against the proposal as well. A traditional party of the right that had taken security-oriented positions on immigration before chose not to align with the CiU. According to Lucia Figar, former PP Immigration Minister in the Autonomous Community of Madrid, the CiU integration contract proposal was akin to a ‘human rights ration card’ (Davis, 2008, p. 146).

Article 138 of Catalonia’s new autonomy statute officially allowed the Generalitat to assume new competences in immigrant management, mainly related to reception, social integration and work permits.6 The tripartite government retained its control of the Catalan government in the 2006 elections and continued to press the points in the Citizenship and Immigration Plan. A subsequent lull in the immigration debate was broken by events in the tiny city of Vic. The decision by the CiU-led municipal council to block undocumented immigrants from inscribing in the municipal register—thus depriving them of basic social rights—ignited harsh criticism from the central government, now controlled by the PSOE. PSOE leader José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero declared in the European Parliament: ‘We shall not accept that human beings find themselves without assistance or unable to attend school . . . we will not let them downgrade the rights of immigrants’ (El País, 2010). Yet, the tripartite government initially accepted the legitimacy of the Vic council’s decision even though doing so contradicted its previous position and left-leaning orientation. The anti-immigrant Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC) had made a breakthrough at the municipal level, indicating that xenophobic attitudes were on the rise in Catalonia, which appeared to have been factored into the government’s decision (Arango, 2013, p. 9). The central leadership of the CiU initially gave its full support to the initiative of the Vic municipal council, arguing that the claim of a ‘crisis of integration’ in Catalonia had legitimacy. Eventually, the municipal government in Vic withdrew its regulation amidst pressure from the regional and central governments, but the episode called into question the image of CiU as a party in favour of an inclusive version of Catalan citizenship.

The tripartite government, embarrassed by its initial handling of the Vic controversy, continued to promote the extension of rights to everyone living in Catalonia, as indicated in the fourth Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2009–2012). The only significant change from the previous plan was an emphasis on the new powers of the Catalan Secretariat for Immigration according to the new autonomy statute. Yet, surveys confirmed that racist and xenophobic sentiments in Catalonia continued to rise and the opposition parties attempted to capitalize on this (Noguer, 2011a). The Catalan wing of the PP, Partit Popular de Catalunya (PPC), followed the lead of the central leadership and proffered a populist approach that bordered on outright xenophobia. One of the party’s leaders, Alicíà Sánchez-Comacho, distributed pamphlets linking crime and immigration in poor neighbourhoods in the Barcelona area. In a move that caused much controversy, the PPC posted a downloadable videogame in which Sánchez-Comacho is seen shooting at immigrants and Catalan separatists. The centrepiece of its anti-immigrant campaign was an integration contract similar to the one previously suggested by the CiU, but with stricter obligations and punishments such as expulsion from the country for being unemployed. The left-wing parties called the proposal ‘xenophobic and populist’ and the CiU responded by rehashing
Pujol’s original discourse that Catalonia is a society of immigrants (Catalan News Agency, 2010).

Neither the governing coalition nor the CiU, however, could ignore the electoral pressures created by the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the PPC. In May 2010, the Catalan Parliament approved the Llei d’acollida de les persones immigrades i las retornades a Catalunya (Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia), which linked the approval and renewal of residency permits—now controlled by the Generalitat—to the successful completion of cultural, linguistic and work-related courses. This shift away from the concept of residence-based citizenship was supported by all parties, but the CiU opposed two concomitant positions by the left-wing parties: allowing immigrants to vote in local elections after five years of permanent residence and having access to employment in the Catalan public service. This modest objection to extending the rights of immigrants with permanent residence status can be attributed, at least partly, to the CiU’s decision to compete with the PPC and PxC for voters concerned about immigration matters.

The November 2010 Catalan elections resulted in big gains for the CiU, but the performance of the PPC is notable as it was the only other party to increase its seat total in the Generalitat. With the economic crisis and renewed emphasis on separatism, immigration has lost some traction in debates about Catalonia’s national identity. Nevertheless, coinciding with growing xenophobic sentiments among the public, the CiU has resolutely dropped multiculturalism from its platform and adopted a brand of integrationism in tune with the European trend to pursue liberal aims through ‘illiberal’ means (Joppke, 2007; Triadafilopoulos, 2011). In 2011, leader of the CiU Artus Mas stated publicly that immigrants must certify their knowledge of the Catalan language as a ‘crucial requirement’ to demonstrate their ‘effort of integration’ (Noguer, 2011b). As the CiU continues to make advances towards holding a referendum on Catalan sovereignty, it appears that immigrants in an independent Catalonia would not become Catalan simply by living in and expressing a will be to Catalan, but would have to prove that they are, objectively so.

**Basque Country**

The Basque Country also had two major waves of immigration from within Spain prior to the end of Francoism. Rapid industrialization around the turn of the twentieth century transformed Bilbao into a magnet for Castilian migrants looking for employment. By 1900, half of Bilbao’s population had no Basque ancestry (Corcuera, 1979, p. 73). This coincided with the rise of Basque nationalism and its main political party, the PNV, which formed in 1895. The PNV’s founder, Sabino Arana, was committed to the preservation of the Basque race and rejected the inclusion of non-ethnic Basques in the nation (Conversi, 1990).

By the time of the second great wave of immigration to the Basque Country in the 1950s and 1960s, the Basque nationalist movement had begun to splinter. The virulent repression of Basque culture and language combined with inaction by the PNV led a group of youths to form Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA). One of the defining features of ETA’s nationalism was its inclusionary character: anyone who supported the goals of the nationalist movement would be considered a Basque patriot (Heiberg, 1979). Whereas Arana and the PNV relegated Euskara to secondary importance, ETA members afforded much greater importance to making Euskara the language of the nation (Urla, 2012). Perhaps because
of the groundswell of support for ETA during this period, some within the PNV reconsidered their racial understanding of the nation. A well-cited manifesto in the PNV newsletter delivered the message to immigrants, ‘welcome to our land, which is also your land, you are Basque’ and called on them to ‘assume fully the duties which the impending crucial situation demands from us all’ (Conversi, 1997, p. 282). Nevertheless, as the transition to democracy occurred, the PNV remained hesitant to clarify its position on immigrants and the role of Euskara as a marker of integration. Xabier Arzalluz, the leader of the PNV from 1979 to 2004, made frequent reference to Basque blood type as a distinguishing marker of ‘real’ Basques. This served as a reminder that, ‘in the eyes of the jeltzales (supporters of the PNV), there are two classes of citizens, depending on their ethnic purity and place of birth’ (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007, pp. 150–151).

The Basque Country negotiated a high level of political autonomy within Spain following the democratic transition, but without much thought given to immigration. Article 17 of the Basque Statute of Autonomy gives the Spanish state full responsibility for immigration, but does not elaborate which precise competencies (e.g. admissions, reception policy, etc.) are included. This remained a moot point during the 1980s and 1990s, as immigration rates to the Basque Country were low in comparison with other parts of Spain. The situation changed after 2000 as the immigration population grew rapidly in the Basque Country’s major cities and surrounding areas. To put the Basque immigration ‘boom’ in perspective, in 1998 immigrants made up less than 1% of the population and that percentage had risen to 7% by 2007, which does not include those who have obtained Spanish citizenship and the Basque-born children of immigrants (Jeram, 2013). With a total population that barely exceeds two million, the approximately 152,000 foreigners in the Basque Country—who are concentrated in urban areas—are a highly visible population.

The demographic changes that occurred in the Basque Country during the 2000s were incidental to the reform to the Law on Aliens—Spain’s primary immigration law—carried out in 2000 by the PP central government. Law 8/2000 created important distinctions between regular and irregular aliens in the realms of health care and education. According to the law’s provisions, irregular aliens only have access to public health care in ‘emergencies’ and the right to education applies only to resident aliens. Under the previous Law 4/2000, all school-aged immigrants had a right to education and health care was widely available to undocumented immigrants. Law 8/2000 has also facilitated the swift expulsion of immigrants without a permit or with a recently expired permit and ended the right to automatic permanent residency after three years of residence.

Law 8/2000 solicited a reaction from pro-human rights and immigrant organizations in the Basque Country that promptly led to a political response. In 2001, the PNV won the autonomic elections for the seventh consecutive time, but failed to earn enough seats to form a majority government. The three parties that ended up forming a tripartite government—PNV, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) and Izquierda Unida (IU)—each expressed a nationalist position broadly defined, but diverged quite significantly along the right–left ideological spectrum. Nevertheless, the tripartite government was able to proceed with its agenda in the immigration portfolio without any significant internal conflict. The parliamentary debate that followed decree 40/2002, which created a Basque Directorate of Immigration within the Department of Housing and Social Affairs, highlighted the conflicting understandings of the Spanish Constitution held by Basque nationalists and the PP. The Basque wing of the PP questioned the necessity of a directorate dedicated to
implementing and monitoring immigration policies because, according to the Spanish Constitution, doing so is the exclusive prerogative of the central government.9

The first Basque Immigration Plan (PVI) was debated in a plenary session of the Basque Parliament in April of 2004 after its approval by the Basque government in 2003. The timing and content of the first immigration plan leave little doubt that it was elaborated in reaction to the restrictive immigration laws put in place by the PP at the state level. According to the introduction of the PVI written by Javier Madrazo, the Basque Minister of Housing and Social Affairs at the time:

This first Basque Immigration Plan cannot be separated from the existence of restrictive Spanish and European policies, as well as the vulnerable situation in which immigrants find themselves when they come to the Basque Country. The reforms to the Spanish Law on Aliens, depriving foreigners of human rights and liberties, continue without responding to the difficulties that immigrants in Spain are facing. (Gobierno Vasco, 2003, p. 4)

The emphasis on a distinctive Basque citizenship in the PVI was also a source of conflict between the tripartite government and the PP. The Law on Aliens, according to the PVI, creates distinctions between Spanish citizens and immigrants in terms of basic human rights. True integration, argued the tripartite government, will be achieved only by recognizing a ‘new status of citizenship disconnected from the attribution of Spanish nationality’ (Gobierno Vasco, 2003, p. 79). In essence, the tripartite government sought to conceptualize Basque citizenship as more inclusive, respectful of human rights, and based solely on residence, in contrast to Spanish citizenship, which it considered to be prejudiced, exclusive and xenophobic.

The PVI does not provide a philosophy of cultural integration that can be easily categorized as assimilationist or multiculturalist. Nevertheless, taken together, various sections of the plan redefine what it means ‘to be Basque’ in the current context of diversity. There is no mention of race, culture, or nationality to define the ‘other’ in relation to the indigenous Basque. The PVI is directed at those from outside the Basque Country without European citizenship and with few resources, which puts them at risk of social exclusion. In order to prevent exclusion and foster integration, the tripartite government will:

promote initiatives aimed at the simultaneous development of Basque and other cultures present in the Basque Country, which also involves encouraging the learning of both official languages of the Basque Country—Euskara and Spanish—with particular attention to ensuring young foreigners have the opportunity to learn Euskara. (Gobierno Vasco, 2003, pp. 71–72)

The PVI thus presents a more ambiguous articulation of linguistic nationalism when compared with the Catalonian case. This probably stems from the PNV’s commitment to reviving Euskara, which is tempered by the reality that Spanish remains an important language in workplaces and Basque society more generally (Urla, 2012). It also still remains the case that many jeltzales do not consider speaking Euskara as a condition of one’s status as Basque.

As immigration gained political traction in Spain, the Basque branch of the PP began to introduce populist rhetoric and defend the Spanish Law on Aliens more confidently. The
2005 elections returned the PNV-led nationalist coalition to the regional executive and the government approved the second PVI in June 2007, which was debated in a plenary session of the Basque Parliament the following year. The Basque PP put forth 39 motions for resolution to the second PVI, which included a plan to study the economic contributions of immigrants to the Basque Country and carry out more inspections of apartments thought to be housing immigrants without proper documentation. During the debate, Madrazo denounced the PP for ‘electioneering’, seeking to ‘connect with the segment of the population who holds negative views on immigration’, and ‘trying to feed racist and xenophobic sentiments, a strategy that has functioned well in other countries’ (Astekari digitala, 2008).

The minister’s words, supported by the tripartite government, were driven not only by the resolution proposals, but also by the PP’s electoral campaign at the state level that featured the controversial integration contract. The PP’s proposal would oblige all immigrants in Spain to affirm their commitment to Spanish laws and to do everything possible to learn Spanish and integrate into the national culture. The tripartite government perceived the integration contract proposal as an assimilationist policy that forces immigrants to conform with Spain’s singular nationality; the integration model favoured by the Basque government did not require immigrants to abandon their home cultures. During debate, Medrazo remarked that the PP’s integration contract is meant to foment anti-immigrant sentiments and undermine the dignity of immigrants by obliging them to ‘take an afternoon siesta, eat paella, and be submissive to the monarchy’ (Astekari digitala, 2008). The tripartite executive pointed to the second PVI as an affirmation of their commitment to foster a truly intercultural society that is based on respect for diverse identities that live together in the Basque Country (Gobierno Vasco, 2007).

The 2009 Basque elections brought to an end nearly three decades of PNV-led governments. The Basque PP and the Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE) formed the first non-nationalist coalition government since the commencement of Basque autonomic elections in 1980. After winning the 2004 state-wide elections, the PSOE provided amnesty to a number of irregular immigrants, which the PP claimed was akin to rewarding immigrants for breaking the law. Nevertheless, in the Basque context, the two parties were united by their commitment to block the sovereigntist intentions of the PNV and other nationalist parties. In 2010, the coalition used its executive powers to shut down the juridical service called HELDU (Legal Service and Social Care for Immigrants), which was put in place by the previous nationalist government to provide immigrants with specialized advice on procedures concerning their legal status. The HELDU service earned rave reviews from immigration associations in the Basque Country because it helped to ameliorate the perceived ‘vicious circle’ created by the Law on Aliens. In the words of an immigrant in the Basque Country involved in protests against the cuts to immigration services by the non-nationalist coalition: ‘without work, you cannot get a residence permit, and without a residence permit, you cannot get work’ (López, 2009). The nationalist parties in the Basque Parliament criticized the decision to close HELDU and many PNV-governed town councils asked the government to reconsider its decision (El Mundo, 2010).

The PP–PSE coalition decided to take a two-year period to reflect upon and evaluate the second PVI before enacting a third, eliciting complaints from the PNV. The non-nationalist government was true to its word, however, and approved the third immigration framework with a revised name: Basque Plan for Immigration, Citizenship, and Interculturalism.
This framework was approved by the governing council in late November 2011 and presented to the Basque Parliament for debate in February 2012. The PNV humbly acknowledged that it agrees with the proposed actions and philosophy of the plan, but still put forth 38 motions for resolution, touching upon sensitive issues such as working conditions for immigrants, the meaning of interculturalism, campaigns condemning xenophobic attitudes, and special programmes for refugees (Antia, 2012). These resolutions continue the PNV’s attempt to position itself to the political left on immigration issues. This cannot be explained by ideology alone, as the PNV is a traditional centre-right party that identifies itself as part of the European Christian Democratic party family. The PNV has connected immigration with the broader nationalist discourse to reinforce its claim that the Basque nation has different values than the Spanish one and to buoy national solidarity.

Conclusion

This article has sought to document and explain the development and progression of immigrant integration as a political issue in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Both autonomous communities within Spain are home to strong nationalist movements that were, to some extent, responsible for the decentralization of Spain following the end of Francoism and the transition to democracy. SSNPs, the main representatives of political nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia, have relentlessly projected the image of a cohesive territorially based national community that does not belong to the nation associated with the state. The message of internal cohesiveness from SSNPs has often pointed to distinct languages, cultures and values that mark off their nation from the wider state. The intuitive argument that immigrants would be threatening to sub-state national cohesiveness and solicit exclusionary responses from SSNPs has not borne out. In fact, we find in both cases strong discourses by the main SSNPs that favour the inclusion of immigrants in the national territory with few obligations.

During the first two waves of internal migration from central and southern Spain to the Basque and Catalan territories, it was Basque nationalism that proffered a more exclusionary response. According to Arana’s original doctrine for the PNV, Euskara was of secondary importance to race, and thus an immigrant could not ‘become Basque’. In Catalonia, the national identity pivoted around residence and respect for the indigenous language and culture, providing newcomers with the capacity to integrate. This variation had disappeared by the time foreign immigration became a political and social issue in Spain around the turn of century. Neither the PNV nor the CiU used its position as the dominant SSNP in its respective autonomous parliament to foster anti-immigrant rhetoric or pursue tough assimilationist policies. Certainly, this outcome fits with Kymlicka’s argument that political autonomy leads sub-state nations to adopt post-ethnic multiculturalism in response to foreign immigration. Nevertheless, the teleological nature of the argument neglects the instrumental nature of the key causal mechanism between autonomy and openness to diversity: the imperative to reproduce the nation by connecting new distinguishing values with the broader nationalist struggle.

This comparison of Catalonia and the Basque Country also provides further insights as to why SSNPs sometimes shift their position regarding the nationalism—immigration nexus. Autonomic parliaments and institutions serve as focal points for nationalist mobilization because they provide incentives for SSNPs to preserve decentralized powers and to
acquire new ones (Lecours, 2012, p. 274). In the context of party competition along both the right–left and nationalist–centralist axes, SSNPs must stake a position that is both vote-maximizing and can still be connected to the values of the nation. It is not a coincidence that the CiU unveiled its plan to install an integration contract linking cultural integration to citizenship rights while the Generalitat was governed by a leftist coalition made up of nationalists and a constitutionalist party sympathetic to Catalan issues. In the Basque case, the PNV seized an opportunity to make diversity a new marker of identity in response to the reforms to the Law on Aliens by the PP and its venerable attack on Basque nationalism. The PNV and its coalition partners have since been consistent in criticizing attempts to deprive immigrants of social rights and creating distinctions between irregular and legal immigrants. Moreover, the identity aspect of the PNV’s programme has supported multiculturalism and a soft emphasis on Euskara as an important language for immigrants to have the opportunity to learn. No SSNPs in the Basque Country have proffered anti-immigrant positions, allowing the PNV to maintain confidently the link between the promotion of internal diversity and Basque values. Perhaps the lower proportion of foreigners currently residing in the Basque Country in comparison with Catalonia also weighs in on the variance in SSNP discourses, but the evidence from elsewhere does not easily corroborate this interpretation. The Netherlands, with a foreign population of 3.9% in 2009, well below the EU average, is considered a ‘pioneer’ of the strategy of civic integration to limit immigration, especially family reunification (Goodman, 2011).

The unit of analysis in this article has been the main SSNPs in the Basque Country and Catalonia, respectively, as they are considered the drivers of nationalist movements and public opinion in their regional settings (Hepburn, 2009a). Nevertheless, the data presented here beg the question of whether public opinion in Catalonia and the Basque Country is in tune with the main SSNPs on the immigration issue. Escandell & Ceobanu (2010) conclude that strong ‘national-regional’ identification among individuals in Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country triggers exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants. In other words, they suggest that supporting an SSNP in these contexts makes an individual more likely to hold anti-immigrant sentiments. There are a few reasons, however, why we ought to remain sceptical of their findings. First, the data used to carry out the analysis were drawn from the period 1991–2000, well before the immigration ‘boom’ occurred in the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, in Catalonia. Second, the manner in which they group the three regions together is problematic given that nationalism is much stronger in the Basque Country and Catalonia than in Galicia. Galician nationalists do not share the same collective memory of repression as do their Catalan and Basque counterparts. Yet, we cannot determine from their analysis whether exclusionary attitudes among Galician nationalists drove the significant coefficients; perhaps Catalan and Basque nationalists are more ‘sympathetic’ towards immigrants. Finally, as the authors acknowledge, the questions used to construct the dependent variable refer to the abstract notion of ‘Spanish society’ (Escandell & Ceobanu, 2010, p. 175). Respondents in the nationalist regions may be expressing their rejection of the Spanish state and Spaniards rather than diversity generated by foreign immigration, which would render their conclusions partial.

If these results are taken at face value, they have strong implications for the main arguments presented here, namely that SSNPs in Spain have presented pro-diversity positions to bolster the legitimacy of the nationalist drive for autonomy or independence. The ‘hidden consensus’ argument, according to which political parties other than radical
right-wing ones make decisions about integration policies behind closed doors and ignore public opinion (Freeman, 1995), can help to reconcile the findings in this article with those of Escandell & Ceobanu (2010). Basque SSNPs must contend with the perception of a link between violence and Basque nationalism, and thus may be more motivated to present a liberal position despite negative perceptions of immigration held by a sizeable portion of their constituency. In the Catalan case, the CiU’s push to reform the autonomy statute in 2006 and include immigrant reception policy as a competence of the Generalitat may have held their more assimilationist views in check, even if the public did not favour multiculturalism.

What does this suggest about the evolution of sub-state nationalism in Spain and the advanced industrial world? Evidently, it demonstrates that the nation-building discourse of SSNPs can move beyond traditional appeals that link the nation to an explicit history, culture and language. As Béland and Lecours (2008, p. 24) have argued, public policy positions ‘can serve to establish identity distinctiveness in a different manner from, but parallel to, culture and/or history’. This finding contradicts the ethnosymbolist approach to nationalism, closely associated with the work of Anthony Smith (2009), which argues that nations must be based on myths that cannot be artificially invented by elites in a top-down manner. Correspondingly, attempts by SSNPs to manage the tension between pluralism and homogenization with symbols that highlight diversity rather than unity are bound to fail because the former have less mobilizing potential (Convensi, 2013). Perhaps, then, the addition of anti-multiculturalist rhetoric to the portfolio of SSNPs in Catalonia, Quebec and Flanders is indicative that too much sociological diversity and recognition of such diversity will, at some point, cause a crisis of identity within SSNPs and the wider sub-state nationalist community. Future research should delve into whether the rejection of multiculturalism is driven by electoral and rationalist concerns, or whether the renewed focus on societal cohesion is a manifestation of a desired return to homogeneity. Studies that pay closer attention to the link between public opinion and the positions of SSNPs in the ambit of immigrant integration would be a good first step to answering this puzzle.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to express his thanks to Leslie Seidle, Phil Triadafilopoulos and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The author also extends a special thanks to Esteve Mirella Sanchez for his diligent research assistance.

Notes
1. A notable exception is the right-wing party Plataforma per Catalunya in Catalonia; the party nearly gained enough votes to enter the Catalan Parliament in 2010 and has a strong presence in the town halls of municipalities with high immigrant populations.
2. This quote comes from Scottish National Party leader Alex Salmond’s speech delivered as he was sworn in as Scotland’s first minister on 20 May 2011.
4. Immigrants had to pay for equivalent Spanish classes, which may have caused many to choose to learn Catalan rather than Spanish.
5. The CiU won 56 seats in the Generalitat, while the combined seat total of the left-leaning PSC, ERC and ICV was 74.
6. Following its approval by the central institutions of Spain, the autonomy statute was subject to criticism for supposedly breaking the spirit of the 1978 Constitution. The resultant ruling by the Constitutional Court of Spain in 2010 limited the effect of certain articles, which has buoyed public support for an independent Catalonia.
7. The PNV is a traditional European Christian Democratic party with fairly conservative views on the management of the economy, whereas the EA and IU are more left-leaning parties.
8. Personal interview with Omer Oke, former Basque Director of Immigration, Bilbao, 23 September 2010.
9. Plenary session of the Basque Parliament, 06/08/03/00/0056, 09/06/2000, 55, 4.
10. The relationship between the PSOE and PP at the state level has become more acrimonious in recent decades, ending the informal pact to govern by consensus adopted following the transition.
11. Galician nationalist parties tend to win between 15 and 25% of the vote in regional elections, considerably lower than in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

References
Asteaearidigitala (2008) Madraza acusa el PP de alimentar sentimientos xenófobos y racistas que conectan con la extrema derecha, available online at: http://www.astraearidigitala.net/noticiasDetalle.asp?tm=1&sb=3&id=5242


